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gion can express absolute truth depends on the precise character of its
symbolism. And the precise character of the symbolism of any religion
is an empirical fact, which cannot be deduced a priori.
It is therefore impossible to be certain that no religion will arise in
the future which will express the truth more adequately than Christian-
ity. It may be said, indeed, that such a religion would be improbable. It
might be maintained that Christianity gets so near to absolute truth, that
if people got any nearer they would have reached the truth itself, and
require no symbols at all. But of this it is impossible to be certain. New
religions cannot be predicted, but it does not follow that they are impos-
sible.
263. The truth of Hegel s statement however, if it is confined to the
past, cannot be denied. No religion in history resembles the Hegelian
philosophy so closely as Christianity. The two great questions for reli-
gion if indeed they can be called two are the nature of the Absolute
and its relation to the finite. The orthodox Christian doctrines of the
Trinity and the Incarnation are not, as we have seen, compatible with
Hegel s teaching. But they are far closer to that teaching than the doc-
trines of any other religion known to history.
In this way, and this way, I believe, alone, the difficult question of
Hegel s relation to Christianity admits of a solution. The difficulty is
increased by a change in Hegel s method of exposition when he reaches
the Absolute Religion. In dealing with the lower religions, he had de-
scribed those religions in the form in which they were actually held by
those who believed them or, at any rate, in what he believed to be that
form and had then pointed out in what degree they fell short of abso-
lute truth. But, when he came to Christianity, he did not expound the
Christian doctrines themselves, but that absolute truth which, according
to him, they imperfectly symbolised. This not unnaturally produced the
impression that the doctrines of Christianity not only symbolised the
absolute truth, but actually were the absolute truth. But closer examina-
tion dispels this, for it shows, as I have endeavoured to show in this
Chapter, that Hegel s doctrines are incompatible with any form of Chris-
tianity which has ever gained acceptance among men.
264. Thus the result is that Hegel does not regard his system as
Christian but holds Christianity to be the nearest approach which can
be made to his system under the imperfect form of religion. And that he
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology/211
is right in both parts of this the positive and the negative may be
confirmed from experience.
Christian apologists have not infrequently met the attacks of their
opponents with Hegelian arguments. And so long as there are external
enemies to meet, the results are all that they can desire. Against Scepti-
cism, against Materialism, against Spinozistic Pantheism, against De-
ism or Arianism nothing is easier than to prove by the aid of Hegel
that wherever such creeds differ from orthodox Christianity, they are in
the wrong. But this is not the end. The ally who has been called in
proves to be an enemy in disguise the least evident but the most dan-
gerous. The doctrines which have been protected from external refuta-
tion are found to be transforming themselves till they are on the point of
melting away, and orthodoxy finds it necessary to separate itself from
so insidious an ally.
This double relation of Hegelianism to Christian orthodoxy can be
explained by the theory which I have propounded. If orthodox Chris-
tianity, while incompatible with Hegelianism, is nevertheless closer to it
than any other religion, it is natural that Hegelianism should support
Christianity against all attacks but its own, and should then reveal itself
as an antagonist an antagonist all the more deadly because it works
not by denial but by completion.
Chapter IX: The Further Determination of the
Absolute
265. The progress of an idealistic philosophy may, from some points of
view, be divided into three stages. The problem of the first is to prove
that reality is not exclusively matter. The problem of the second is to
prove that reality is exclusively spirit. The problem of the third is to
determine what is the fundamental nature of spirit.
The result of the second stage, though comprehensive, is still ab-
stract, and is therefore defective even from a theoretical point of view. It
does not enable us to see the ultimate nature of the universe, and to
perceive that it is rational and righteous. We only know in an abstract
way that it must be rational and righteous, because it fulfils the formal
condition of rationality and righteousness harmony between the na-
ture of the universal and the nature of the individual. Such a skeleton is
clearly not complete knowledge. And it is therefore, to some extent,
incorrect and inadequate knowledge; for it is knowledge of an abstrac-
tion only, while the truth, as always, is concrete. The content of the
universe has not been produced by, or in accordance with, a self-subsis-
tent law. It is the individual content of the universe which is concrete
and self-subsistent, and the law is an abstraction of one side of it, with
which we cannot be contented. From a theoretical point of view, then,
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