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fighting to drag out its resolution, but I can t see [it].
[12 July 1955]
I came to the conclusion that there was no reason for
us to drag out this matter, since time was beginning to
Comrades. I want to read you a telegram which com.
work against us. In Austria we are losing our good
Gromyko cited in part, since this document is of interest in
position by dragging out a resolution to the issue of a
understanding the position of the Yugoslav leaders. It is a
peace treaty with the country. I then say to com. Bulganin:
communication from our ambassador in Yugoslavia about
- You know what I think, Nikolai Aleksandrovich? In
a conversation with com. Tito.
my opinion, the Austrian issue as Molotov understands it
On 29 June com. Tito invited the Soviet ambassador
is reminiscent of an egg which has gone bad. Soon you
to visit him and had a lengthy conversation with him.
will have to throw it in the garbage because everything
Here is what com. Val kov wrote about that:
will change and there will be no value in resolving it
In a conversation with me on 29 June Tito told me
positively. And that is really so.
the following:
But if we had gone halfway [vyshli navstrechu] with a
At present, Tito said, there are many conversations
resolution of the Austrian issue when the events connected
among the Yugoslavs and foreign representatives, sur-
with the conclusion of the Paris agreement had just
rounding the communication published in the Yugoslav
ripened, after all, then the issue of these agreements could
press on 28 June about his, Tito s, acceptance of an
have arisen in a different way.
invitation to visit the Soviet Union.
Voice from the Presidium. Correct.
I noted that at a lunch in the Egyptian mission on 28
Voice from the hall. The Paris agreement wouldn t
June the Canadian ambassador, the Egyptian envoy, the
have come about.
Japanese envoy, and the English consul all asked me about
Khrushchev. We put forward the Austrian issue in a
this issue. After this Tito noted that he would be happy to
discussion of the CC Presidium. I said to com. Molotov:
visit the Soviet Union and, in keeping with the understand-
- Listen, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, you understand
ing with comrades Khrushchev and Bulganin, the trip
this issue. But some comrades and I do not understand
would take place next year. Concerning [U.S. Secretary of
why we should delay the conclusion of a treaty with
State John Foster] Dulles announcement at a 28 June
Austria. Explain to us how you understand it. Perhaps I
press conference on the fact that the possibility of the
will begin to understand it differently; after all, we aren t
Yugoslav president s visiting the United States of America
fools. And when I understand, I will support you; after all,
would be reviewed favorably if the Marshal expressed a
right now I don t see anything complicated in it. I see only
desire to visit the United States of America, Tito said that
stupidity on our side, which consists of the fact that we are
the Americans would have to wait a long time for the
dragging out the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria
expression of such a desire, if indeed they ever wait long
for no apparent reason.
enough [to hear it]. (Laughter in the hall). Not badly
We discussed the issue and came to the conclusion
put!
that we should conclude a peace treaty with Austria, [and]
Voice from the audience. Not bad...
make sure that Austria became a neutral state. When we
Now on Austria. This is a very important issue. I
came to such a decision, Molotov said:
remember how Stalin, about a year before his death, said
- It is good that it was decided this way. After all, I
several times:
did not object to such a decision.
- Why don t we conclude a treaty with Austria?
Comrades! We, all of the members of the Presidium,
But this matter kept being postponed; it was said that
each spoke to Molotov twice, reporting to him that it was
we would resolve it after Trieste. When the Trieste matter
necessary to stop dragging out the Austrian issue and to
got cleared up, comrade Stalin again ask[ed]:
resolve it. And you know how we usually resolve issues in
- Why aren t we concluding a treaty with Austria?
the Presidium, we don t speak because everything is
After Stalin s death, somehow com. Malenkov and I
already clear and that issue that has been brought for
began talking with com. Molotov about Austria. He told
examination does not need additional clarification. And
us that the Austrian issue was a very complex one which
here, I repeat, we all spoke several times without convinc-
we needed very much [i.e. to keep on the agenda without
ing com. Molotov that it was impossible to delay any
resolving it], [and] that its resolution had to be delayed.
further on this matter.
Here, at the plenum, I will frankly say that I believed
Kaganovich. And [we spoke] quite sharply [i
Molotov s word on everything, [and] like many of us,
dovol no ostro].
thought that he was a great and experienced diplomat.
Khrushchev. During the discussion I ask[ed] com.
Sometimes you d look and then reason and think:
Molotov:
- Damn it [chert voz mi], maybe I am missing
- Tell me, please, are you for or against war?
something! After all, that is what it means to be a diplo-
- No, he says, I am against war.
mat he sees, and I don t see anything (laughter in the
- Then what are you achieving by having our troops
hall). I m telling you this in all sincerity.
sit in Vienna? If you stand for war, then it would be
Some time passed, and I still wanted to find out what
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 43
correct to stay in Austria. It is a beach-head [platsdarm], issue?
and only a fool would give up such a beach-head if he Perhaps in another month he will say that he approved
planned to make war now. If [you are] not for war, then the resolution on the Yugoslav issue as well?
we have to leave. In our country, communists do not Or take the issue of arms control. For a long time we
understand you; the Austrian communists do not under- took an incorrect position, proposing to cut the armed
stand, and Austrian workers begin to see our troops as forces of all countries by one third. With such a stance on
occupiers. Communists abroad also do not understand us. the issue [postanovka voprosa], they will send us to the
Why are we sitting in Austria; what are we waiting for devil and put forward convincing arguments as well. Who
there? will make such an agreement? We have so many million
Com. Molotov was commissioned to prepare a draft. [men] at arms (and the Americans have data on this). We
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